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Abstract
This study explores how relative skilled-wage premia aﬀect FDI. Contrary to
previous studies based on factor endowment diﬀerences, we ﬁnd strong support for
vertical FDI, in the sense that more FDI is conducted in countries where unskilled
labor is relatively cheap. In addition, we ﬁnd that relative skill-premia also aﬀect
FDI activities that have previously been associated with horizontal FDI, i.e. local
aﬃliate sales. Consequently, the potential eﬀects of changes in the relative wage
costs on international production reallocation within MNEs are large. In fact, if not
for the 8% rise in the US skilled wage premium relative to the average host country
between 1986-1994, annual US aﬃl i a t es a l e sa b r o a di nr e l a t i o nt oU SG D Pw o u l d
have been half a percentage point higher.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the theoretical literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs), two diﬀerent theories
have been advanced. First, the theory of horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) stresses
the importance of trade costs and access to local markets as the primary motives for FDI
location decisions. Second, the theory of vertical FDI stresses diﬀerences in relative factor
costs and the fragmentation of production between countries. Through the increasing
integration between countries in diﬀerent stages of development, such as NAFTA or the
enlargement of the EU, the interest in the public debate has focused on vertical FDI theory.
One of the main fears among policy makers is loss of employment, as MNEs relocate their
production to low-wage countries to reap gains from factor cost diﬀerences.1
Contrary to these fears, empirical research has shown relatively little evidence of verti-
cal FDI, whereas there is strong support in favor of the horizontal FDI model (Markusen
and Maskus, 1999, 2001; Blonigen et al., 2002; and Brainard, 1997). The rejection of the
vertical FDI model is usually made in two steps. First, as discussed by e.g. Brainard
(1993), the scope for vertical FDI models is usually regarded as limited, given that verti-
cal FDI is deﬁned as exports from aﬃliates to the home country. This narrow deﬁnition
means that the scope for a vertical decomposition of production is small, given the small
share of these exports in total aﬃliate production.
The second reason why models of vertical FDI tend to be rejected is that relative
labor endowments - measured as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers - do not have a
signiﬁcant, or consistent, impact on the sales of MNEs’ foreign aﬃliates (Carr et al., 2001;
Markusen and Maskus, 1999, 2001; Blonigen et al., 2002). This has lead to the conclusion
that vertical FDI and, hence, international diﬀerences in relative factor endowments, are
of no importance for explaining MNE activities in general. The negative results for vertical
FDI are all the more surprising, given the ample evidence of vertically integrated MNEs,
with upstream and downstream production abroad (Hanson et al. 2001).
1See e.g. the home page of the International Labor Organization (http://www.itcilo.it/english/
actrav/telearn/global/ilo/seura/mains.htm#Globalization and employment) on references to the anti-
globalization debate.
2In contrast, we show that (1) FDI is strongly sensitive to relative factor costs rather
than relative factor endowments, and (2) the scope for vertical decomposition of production
across borders is much larger than shown by previous studies, as it encompasses both
local sales of aﬃliates as well as exports to third countries and imports of aﬃliates from
the home country. These results follow from a number of empirical innovations in the
paper namely; (a) replacing factor endowment data with previously unused relative wage
costs, (b) pooling US and Swedish outward FDI data and (c) systematically investigating
diﬀerent components of aﬃliate activities.
The use of relative factor costs rather than factor endowments has an obvious advan-
tage, since ﬁrms’ incentives to conduct vertical FDI are directly related to relative factor
costs, but only indirectly to factor endowments. There are several explanations why the
link between factor costs and endowments may break down, such as diﬀerences in prefer-
ences, labor market imperfections and distortions.2 In fact, our data show that relative
factor costs and relative factor endowments are not highly correlated. In addition, a low
correlation between diﬀerent measures of factor endowments suggests that measurement
errors are important. In this study, we apply previously unused data on gross wages
of engineers and production workers as measures of the skill premium, obtained from a
published survey of the commercial bank UBS.
The pooling of Swedish and US outward FDI provides us with home-host country
matches of relative endowments for which theory suggests a prevalence of vertical FDI,
whereas the US data in previous studies lack observations exactly where vertical FDI
is expected. The reﬁned set of components of aﬃliate activity allows a more precise
measurement, because some of these components, e.g. exports to the home country and
third countries, are likely to be more sensitive to factor costs than others, e.g. local sales.
In addition to our ﬁnding that relative wage cost diﬀerences between host and home
countries aﬀect aﬃliate sales, we also show that the impact of wage cost diﬀerences varies
systematically with the target for aﬃliate sales. Our results show that the impact of
diﬀerences in the relative wage cost is larger on aﬃliate exports to the MNEs’ home
2See e.g. Brainard (1997) for a discussion.
3country than on aﬃliate exports to other countries, whereas the latter are more dependent
on diﬀerences in the relative wage cost than the aﬃliates’ local sales. Consequently, the
impact of diﬀerences in the relative wage cost is larger for activities with a larger potential
for vertical decomposition of production. Apart from the impact of diﬀerences in the
relative wage cost, we generally ﬁnd that the quantitative eﬀects of other explanatory
variables, such as market size and distance, diﬀer across the three types of aﬃliate sales.
In most cases, these quantitative diﬀerences are in line with what would be expected
from theory, where e.g. (host) market size is more important for local sales than for
aﬃliate exports. We do not, however, ﬁnd any qualitative diﬀerences in the impact from
explanatory variables on the three types of aﬃliate activities: local sales, exports to the
home country and exports to other countries thus seem to be driven by the same factors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Previous studies are brieﬂyd i s c u s s e d
in section 2. In section 3, we discuss the contributions of the paper and how it is related
to previous studies. The data is presented in section 4, while the empirical results are
presented in section 5. In section 6, we give some concluding remarks.
2P r e v i o u s L i t e r a t u r e
MNEs are often classiﬁed to be of the horizontal or vertical type according to their motive
of aﬃliate operations. In general terms, horizontal MNEs conduct FDI in order to improve
access to some host country market, while vertical FDI is undertaken in order to reap
beneﬁts from international factor price diﬀerences.3
The theoretical literature on horizontal FDI is well-known and is not the focus of
this paper.4 Therefore, we concentrate on a brief discussion of vertical FDI models. In
Helpman (1984), the formation of MNEs is driven by factor endowment diﬀerences. The
geographical separation of high-skilled labor intensive headquater services and low-skilled
3See Hanson, Mattaloni, and Slaughter (2001)f o rt h i sd e ﬁnition. Brainard (1993) uses the term factor
proportion theory of FDI instead of vertical FDI theory. In contrast, Markusen (1995) deﬁnes vertical
FDI as a geographical separation of production stages, to which we will refer as fragmentation.
4See Markusen (1995) for a survey.
4labor intensive production activities, leads to cost savings for the MNE. Thus, vertical
FDI is observed in countries suﬃciently abundant in low-skilled labor.
In the Knowledge Capital Model (KC model), developed by Markusen, et al. (1996),
FDI is driven by both factor costs and market access and, thus, the KC model incorporates
both vertical and horizontal FDI. Three ﬁrm types exist in this two-good, two-factor, and
two-country model. The ﬁrst type duplicates a domestic production plant in the host
country (horizontal FDI), whereas the second type slices up the value chain by locating
high-skilled labor intensive headquater services in the high-skilled labor abundant home
country and low-skilled labor intensive production activity in the low-skilled labor abun-
dant host country (vertical FDI).5 The third type solely produces in the home country and
serves foreign markets by exports. MNEs of the vertical type export (part of) their pro-
duction to the home country, while MNEs of the horizontal type sell all their production
locally.6
These predictions are broadly illustrated in the Edgeworth box in Figure 1.C o u n t r y
endowments of skilled and unskilled labor are measured on the vertical and horizontal
axes, respectively. The origin of the home country is in the South-West corner, while
the origin of the potential host country is in the North-East corner of the diagram. The
triangle above the diagonal going through the origins is the parameter space where the
home country is abundant in skilled-labor. Hence, vertical FDI is found in the North-
West corner of the Edgeworth box (VFDI), where relative endowments are very diﬀerent,
while horizontal FDI is found at the center of the Edgeworth box (HFDI), where relative
endowments and relative country size are similar.
Confronting these theories with empirical evidence, we observe quite a diverse picture.
Table 1 gives an overview of previous empirical results. The empirical evidence on hori-
zontal FDI strongly supports the market access and tariﬀ jumping hypothesis (Brainard,
5Hence, vertical FDI is related to international production fragmentation (Venables, 1999), although
the two concepts are not identical.
6The home country of a multinational ﬁrm is deﬁned as the country where the headquater is located.
The host country is deﬁned as the country where the foreign aﬃliates of the corresponding ﬁrm are located.
Other countries are third countries that are neither host nor home countries, but export destinations of
the aﬃliates.
51997) while there is little evidence on vertical FDI driven by relative factor endowments.7
Brainard (1993) ﬁnds mixed evidence for vertical FDI and concludes that it is not em-
pirically important. In addition, and contrary to theory, Brainard (1997) ﬁnds that US
aﬃliate production is signiﬁcantly lower in countries with a relatively low GDP per worker,
which is used as a proxy for skill endowments.8
Carr et al. (2001) ﬁnd support for the Knowledge Capital Model (KC model) which
encompasses both horizontal and vertical FDI. However, when regressing total US aﬃliate
exports on diﬀerences in relative factor endowments, Markusen and Maskus (2001) ﬁnd
a negative relation, contrary to vertical FDI theory. In addition, Markusen and Maskus
(1999) reject the vertical FDI model, as well as the KC model model, in favor of the hor-
izontal FDI model as an explanation for MNE production. Blonigen et al. (2002) argue
that the contradicting results in the above papers stem from an incorrect empirical speciﬁ-
cation of the non-linear functional form in the skill diﬀerence term. This speciﬁcation error
becomes signiﬁcant when pooling US-inward and outward FDI data. When correcting for
this by using absolute values of factor endowment diﬀerences, they show that aﬃliate ac-
tivity between countries decreases as absolute diﬀerences in skill-labor abundancy increase.
This is taken as evidence in favor of horizontal FDI, rejecting the KC model and vertical
FDI as a driving force for FDI activity while using the same data as Carr et al. (2001).
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) investigate US intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows (among
others things) and show that production fragmentation is more widespread than previously
thought. However, they do not relate these trade ﬂows to relative skill endowments or
factor costs. Following Brainard (1997), they use GDP per capita as a skill measure.
They obtain mixed evidence on vertical FDI, ﬁnding that a higher host-country GDP
per capita increases aﬃliate exports, as well as imports from parents, which contradicts
7There is a strand of literature seeking indirect evidence by investigating whether aﬃliate sales or
production are complements or substitutes to trade ﬂows. See e.g. Swedenborg (1979) and Blonigen
(2001). Another related strand of literature explores whether employment in diﬀerent locations, within
the same MNE, are complements or substitutes. See e.g. Brainard and Riker (1997) and Braconier and
Ekholm (2000, 2001a, 2001b).
8However, using Swedish data, Norbäck (2001) ﬁnds some evidence of a positive relation between the
aﬃliate share of foreign sales and the ratio of GDP per capita between the home and the host country.
6vertical FDI theory. However, the share of aﬃliate imports for further processing in total
aﬃliate sales is signiﬁcantly smaller in countries with a large GDP per capita.9
Summing up, the existing empirical evidence on vertical FDI poses two puzzles: (i) why
is there so little evidence on the relation between FDI and relative factor endowments?
(ii) How do we reconcile the fears of exports of employment to cheap labor countries in
the public debate with the fact that the potential scope for vertical FDI seems to be so
small? The following empirical analysis addresses these two puzzles.
3 Contributions
This study makes three distinct improvements on the previous literature. First, we employ
new data on the skilled-wage premium rather than skill endowments. Second, we use a
diﬀerent dataset where we pool US and Swedish outward FDI data. Finally, we consider
a more detailed decomposition of MNE activities.
3.1 Skill measure: Wage premium vs skill endowments
In the theory of vertical MNEs, FDI is driven by skill endowment diﬀerences. As shown
by Markusen et al. (1996), there exists a monotonic relationship between relative skill
endowments and the relative skilled-wage premium. From a general equilibrium point of
view, relative skill endowments are assumed to be exogenous, while relative skilled-wages
are determined endogenously.10 Yet, there are advantages in basing the empirical analysis
9Matthae (2000) has investigated intra-ﬁrm trade of Swedish outward FDI, but he has not used skill
endowments or relative factor costs as explanatory variables either. Görg (2000) regresses US inward
processing trade (within and outside MNEs) by industry into European countries on average, rather than
relative, wage costs and ﬁnds that US inward processing trade into the EU periphery occurs when the
average wage costs are higher rather than lower.
10The endogeneity problem of using relative wages as an explanatory variable is probably negligible in
practice, because FDI activity in any but a few host countries is too small to have an impact on the local
economy. Some evidence of skilled-wage endogeneity is given by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) on US FDI
in Mexico, but Mexico (and possibly Ireland) should be considered as a special case. Nevertheless, we will
pay attention to the possible endogeneity of the wage premium in our econometric analysis.
7on skilled-wage premia rather than on skill endowments.
Firms’ incentives to conduct vertical FDI are directly related to relative factor costs,
but only indirectly to factor endowments. As the link between factor endowments and
factor costs can break down for several reasons, factor costs may give an accurate picture of
the relative proﬁtability of producing in diﬀerent countries, even though factor endowments
may not.11 There are numerous reasons why the mapping from relative endowments to
relative factor costs may be weak, such as labor market distortions, taxes, non-homothetic
preferences and measurement errors.12 These sources of potential discrepancies between
endowments and costs make it more fruitful to directly focus on relative costs.13
As shown in Table 2, the correlation between the host country’s relative skill-premia -
measured as the ratio of the skilled-to-unskilled wage in the host country in relation to the
same ratio in the home country - and a number of measures of relative factor endowments
is low.14 Thus, we would expect endowments and relative skill premia to aﬀect FDI pat-
terns diﬀerently. The correlation matrix in Table 2 also points to potential measurement
errors that show up in relative endowment measures, where the simple correlation between
alternative endowment measures is often fairly low.
11It is only in the case of factor price equalization that factor endowments are a more useful measure,
since the latter determine trade patterns, while the former are not related to the previous two variables.
However, there is no factor price equalization in the KC model, because trade costs are an essential
assumption for explaining the emergence of FDI in this model and factor price equalization breaks down,
when trade costs are positive.
12In this study, we do not explore why the relation between labor endowments and factor costs may be
weak. See Baldwin (1994), for a survey of this issue.
13Note, however, that by focusing on relative costs, we are unable to test the general equilibrium features
of e.g. the KC model.
14The variable SKR is the one used in the previous FDI literature (e.g. Carr et al., 2001) while TYR,
SYR, HYR, ENROLLS are the well-known human capital measures of Barro and Lee (1994). TYRDF is
the corrected TYR measure by Domenech and de la Fuente (2001), and WAGEP is the measure of the
wage premium applied in our analysis. All data are deﬁned in the data appendix.
83.2 Sample coverage: Pooling US and Swedish data
Almost all studies on FDI and relative factor endowments are undertaken for US inward-
and/or outward FDI. The US economy is, by far, the largest in the world. This can be
illustrated in Figure 2 by inserting US outward and inward FDI observations into the
Edgeworth box. The points show the division of bilateral total endowments of skilled
and unskilled labor between the US and the host countries for the US outward data and
the corresponding US inward data, where the US is the host-country. The ﬁgure clearly
shows that the US is, on average, much larger than other host or home countries, as the
bulk of outward US FDI observations is in the North-East corner and the bulk of inward
observations is in the South-West corner.15
A problem with this data set is that the KC model and the vertical FDI model of
Helpman (1984) predict vertical FDI for the US in the North-West corner, where no
observations are found. Consequently, US outward FDI data are not appropriate for
investigating vertical FDI. Even if US outward FDI data are pooled with inward FDI
data, as done by e.g. Carr et al. (2001) and Blonigen et al. (2002), the dataset is far from
optimal. The inward FDI observations (treating the US as host country) are located in
the South-East corner where no vertical FDI should occur.
In contrast to the US, Sweden is a small- or medium-size economy. This means that
by pooling US and Swedish outward FDI data, the joint observations of bilateral FDI
activities (e.g. US-UK, Sweden-UK) cover a much larger part of the endowment box, as
s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .S p e c i ﬁcally, the North-West corner - where we expect vertical FDI to
be prevalent - has a fairly good coverage.
3.3 FDI measures: The scope of Vertical FDI
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e1,an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent dependent variables have been used in the
analysis of vertical FDI. Figure 4 illustrates their relationship. In the following, we argue
why these alternative measures may be related to relative skill premia. We will also discuss
to what extent relative skill premia aﬀect these diﬀerent measures.
15The outliers in both the inward and the outward sample are China and India.
9According to the KC model, relative factor costs mainly inﬂuence exports back to the
home country. As a consequence, vertical FDI is sometimes deﬁned as these exports and
exports back to the home country then determine the scope for factor costs in explaining
FDI.16 However, if production is divided into several steps as in Venables (1999), the
scope for factor costs in explaining FDI is greatly enhanced. To see this, assume that
MNE production can be divided into two steps, upstream (skilled-labor intensive) and
downstream (unskilled-labor intensive). Disregarding trade costs and market size, home
MNEs are more likely to conduct downstream activities only at home if the relative costs
of conducting unskilled-labor intensive activities in the potential host country are high,
i.e. if unskilled labor is relatively expensive in the host country. This would correspond
to serving the foreign market by exports.17 If the relative costs of conducting downstream
activities in the host country were lower, i.e. unskilled labor were relatively cheap, we
would expect to observe more downstream activities in the foreign country and aﬃliate
imports of intermediate goods from the parent company. In this case, aﬃliate production
will only be sold locally, because the additional transport costs for returning the ﬁnal
g o o dt ot h eh o m ec o u n t r yc a n n o tb eo ﬀset by the production cost savings (Venables,
1999). Thus, vertical linkages within MNEs can emerge even if the foreign aﬃliate only
sells the ﬁn a lg o o di nt h el o c a lm a r k e t . 18 Hence, aﬃliate production both for the local
market and for exports is likely to include elements of vertical integration and be aﬀected
by relative factor costs. However, the degree of integration and the sensitivity to relative
factor costs are expected to be stronger for aﬃliate production for exports than for local
sales. Moreover, aﬃliate imports from parent companies in the home country are another
measure of FDI depending on the relative factor costs.
Another feature of the KC model is that it only deals with two countries, whereas
a large fraction of aﬃliate production is actually exported to other countries (export
platform FDI). Given that exports to other countries constitute a large portion of aﬃliate
16See Markusen (1995).
17If local sales and after sales services are important, this would of course imply that a vertical linkage
exists between the parent and the sales aﬃliate, even in this scenario.
18See Venables (1999) on so-called vertical FDI of horizontal type.
10total sales, investigating the role of relative wage costs is important in explaining these
trade ﬂows. In a three-country setting, the MNE may supply the third market with ﬁnal
goods by exporting from home, exporting from the second country or by local production.
If the ﬁrms choose to sell from the second country, third-country exports are associated
with a vertical linkage between the parent and the aﬃliate in the second country. Thus,
we would expect exports to a third country to be aﬀected by the relative wages of the
home and the host country, but also by the relative wages in the export market.19
The relative importance of each MNE activity measure is illustrated in Table 3, where
we have computed total aﬃliate exports to the home country, exports to third countries,
and local sales as well as aﬃliate imports from the parents in the home country. All
numbers are percentage shares of total aﬃliate sales for the years 1986, 1990, 1994 and
1998 and separated by home country, Sweden (Swe) and the US, respectively.
Table 3 reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the aﬃliate activities of US and Swedish
MNEs. On average, aﬃliates of US MNEs export a larger share of their local production
back to the US, wheras the sales of Swedish aﬃliates are directed towards local markets.
Much of this diﬀerence can be attributed to the importance of Mexico and Canada as
hosts for US ﬁrms, while Swedish ﬁrms focus on the European and US markets. Taken at
face value, these numbers would suggest that the role of vertical FDI - in the strict sense of
exports to the home country - is limited as their share of total aﬃliate sales only amounts
to 16 and 7 percent, respectively, in 1998. However, the total exports of aﬃliates make up
44 and 31 percent, respectively, of total aﬃliate sales in 1998. In that respect, the scope
for vertical FDI seems much larger and the role of relative factor prices and endowments
in explaining FDI may also be enhanced. Another observation is that although the bulk
of aﬃliate sales still goes to the host market, that share is decreasing. This decreased
reliance on local sales is accompanied by increased exports, both to the home market and
other markets.
Summing up, not only exports by aﬃliates to the home country, but also exports
to other countries, imports by aﬃliates from parent companies and even local sales are
19See Neary (2001) for a model of horizontal export platform FDI.
11potentially driven by relative factor endowments and/or costs, albeit to a diﬀerent degree.
4D a t a
Table 4 gives preliminary statistics on the dependent and independent variables, which
will be introduced step by step in the following subsections.
4.1 MNE activity measures
A sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n3 . 3 ,w eu s eaw i d er a n g eo fa ﬃliate measures: the sum of manu-
facturing aﬃliate sales in a year by the home and the host country (Total Sales),a ﬃliate
exports back to the home country (Exports to home-country),a ﬃliate exports to countries
other than the home and host countries (Exports to third countries),a ﬃliate sales to the
host-country market (Local Sales), and imports of aﬃliates from their parent company in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y( Imports from parent)20. All data are reported in 1990 USD prices.
The MNE activity data for the US are collected by BEA and have previously been
used in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (1999, 2001).21 The MNE activity
data for Sweden is collected by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) and
described in Braunerhjelm and Ekholm (1998). The precise deﬁnitions are provided in the
data appendix.
The US data are originally annual and span over the time period 1986-1994. The
Swedish data have been collected about every four years from 1970 until 1998. Since we
pool the US and Swedish data, we choose the commonly available years 1986, 1990, 1994,
and 1998.22 The country coverage for both the US and Swedish data is given in the data
20From a theoretical perspective, it would have been ideal if data on intermediate goods imports of
aﬃliates from parent companies had been available. Such data are not available for the US except for two
years, however. The measure total imports from parents may contain direct parent exports to the host
country without further processing by aﬃliates.
21These data was kindly provided by James Markusen.
22We checked that the reduced US sample behaves in a very similar way to the full sample by replicating
estimations of Markusen and Maskus (1999) and Carr et al. (2001) on the reduced dataset and comparing
this with their estimates.
12appendix.
As can be seen in Table 4, aggregate aﬃliate sales by US MNEs are about 18t i m e s
larger than those by Swedish MNEs in the average host country. This roughly reﬂects the
diﬀerence in size between the US and the Swedish economy (about 30 times).
4.2 Skill measures
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the relative skill-structure between the two countries
and their respective hosts. The relative diﬀerence in skill endowments, SKR,i sm e a s u r e d
as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the home economy relative to that in the host
economy. These data, which are standard in the literature (Markusen and Maskus, 1999,
2001, and Carr et al., 2001), are obtained from the International Labour Organization
(ILO). Professional, technical, administrative and managerial workers are classiﬁed as
skilled labor. In terms of the relative endowments of skilled workers, Sweden appears
signiﬁcantly more well-endowed than the US, compared to their respective host countries,
as the former country has a 50 percent larger share of skilled workers in the labor force as
compared to the second.23 Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) use GDP per capita
as a substitute for a skill measure. In terms of relative GDP per capita between the home
and the host country (GDPCAP), the data reveal that Sweden invests more in countries
with a lower GDP per capita.
Another measure of the potential beneﬁts of vertical decomposition across countries
for MNEs is the relative wage diﬀerences for skilled versus less skilled workers. More
precisely, it is convenient to deﬁne the wage premium (WAGEP)a st h er a t i oo ft h e
skilled-to-unskilled wage in the host country, in relation to the same ratio in the home
country, as follows:
WAGEP ≡
wi
U/wi
S
w
j
U/w
j
S
≡
w
j
S/w
j
U
wi
S/wi
U
, (1)
23However, administrative and managerial workers are not reported separately from clerical workers
by ILO for Sweden in 1994. Thus, we had to include the category of clerical workers for Sweden which
inﬂates its average skill endowment. See the data appendix for details. Moreover, there is a switch in the
classiﬁcation from ISCO68 to ISCO88 in the ILO data for some countries at diﬀerent points in time. See
the data appendix for details.
13where wi
S and wi
U are the respective wages for skilled- and unskilled labor in the home
country i,a n dw
j
S and w
j
U are the respective wages for skilled and unskilled labor in the
host country j. Note that the wage premium is high when unskilled labor in the host-
country is relatively cheap. Note also that both the KC model and Helpman (1984) model
predict a positive relation between the variables SKR and WAGEP.
The relative wage costs of skilled and unskilled workers are taken from the Union
Bank of Switzerland (UBS, various issues). About every three years, UBS reports the
gross wages of particular professions: electrical engineers with ﬁve years of professional
experience and industrial workers with three years of vocational training and ten years
of professional experience.24 These data are collected in cities, wherever UBS has its
own aﬃliates. Thus, the wages often apply to the capital, the ﬁnancial center or other
important business centers of a country.
An obvious advantage of these data is that they utilize categories of the labor force
(engineers vs blue-collar workers) highly relevant for the location of multinational activ-
ities within the manufacturing sector. A slight disadvantage is that they are not general
indices. While highly relevant for manufacturing, these wages do by no means cover the
entire spectrum of professions in manufacturing ﬁrms. However, labor market competi-
tion will ensure that similar professions will obtain similar wages. Moreover, data are only
collected for a particular city. Wages are likely to diﬀer across cities, since the living costs
diﬀer. However, an average index of the same profession over the entire country may be
inappropriate, because FDI appears to be highly concentrated to a few centers of a host
country.25 Hence, the restriction of the UBS to only collect data in centers may just be
an appropriate approximation. Nevertheless, to ensure the credibility of the UBS data on
skilled-wage premia, we compare these for some countries with data from national statis-
tical sources in table 13 in the appendix. In spite of the large diﬀerences in deﬁnitions
across those sources, we ﬁnd similar skilled-wage premia.
Table 13 also reveals that the relative wages for engineers in relation to production
24See the data appendix for a more precise description.
25See Stirböck (2001) for evidence on European regions and Shannon and Zeile (1999) for evidence on
U.S. states.
14workers are almost identical in Sweden (1.34) and the US (1.35). Still, in relation to
the respective host countries, the US has a marginally lower skill premium than Sweden,
indicating that US multinationals, on average, tend to invest in host countries with higher
premiums on skilled workers. This is the opposite to what is suggested by relative factor
endowment data and GDP per capita data.
4.3 Additional explanatory variables
Finally, we include investment costs and trade protection indices provided by World Eco-
nomic Forum. Sources, deﬁnitions and computational methods are described in the Ap-
pendix. From Table 4, it follows that US and Swedish MNEs do invest in countries with
somewhat diﬀerent attributes. On average, US ﬁrms are more inclined to invest in coun-
tries with a low GDP (GDPj), high investment costs (INV), and high trade barriers
(PROT).26 Furthermore US aﬃliates are, on average, located further from the home
country than the Swedish ones, as measured by the distance between the capitals of the
host and home countries (DIST). Once again, this relates to the stronger focus on Europe
for Swedish ﬁrms and on emerging market economies for US ﬁrms.
5 Empirical Results
Two diﬀerent estimation strategies have been used in the literature. First, the gravity
equation as in Brainard (1993, 1997) or Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) tests the
determinants of aﬃliate sales by using a simple log-linear speciﬁcation. Second, Carr et al.
(2001) test the KC model with a nonlinear speciﬁcation, including interaction eﬀects. In
this paper, we will ﬁrst apply the general gravity equation and then use the more speciﬁc
KC model equation for a robustness check.
26Naturally, the diﬀerence in host country size (GDPj) is partially dependent on the size of the US
economy as a host of Swedish, but not US, FDI which increases the average host-country size for Sweden
as compared to the US.
155.1 The gravity equation estimations
We successively use the FDI activity measures described in section 3.3 as the dependent
variable, denoted salesijt. We follow Brainard (1997) in estimating a log-linear gravity
equation of FDI activity by home country i in host country j at time t, but use the same
control variables as Carr et al. (2001):27
salesijt = β0 + β1gdpit + β2gdpjt + β3distij + β4wagepijt + β5invcjt + β6protjt + εijt, (2)
where lower case letters indicate natural logarithms of variables (i.e. x =l n( X))a n dεijt
is the usual error term. Furthermore, we include time dummies, a home country dummy
US, and a home country-neighbour dummy ADJ to capture time-speciﬁce ﬀects, home-
country speciﬁce ﬀects, and border eﬀects, respectively.28 Our novel independent variable
of interest is the skill premium (wagepijt). Since we argued in section 3.3 that aﬃliate
exports to the home country are expected to be most sensitive to skill diﬀerences, we start
out with results on this dependent variable.
5.1.1 Aﬃliate exports to home country
In Table 5, column 1, we report the results obtained from regressing exports to the home
country on the wage premium (wagepijt). This result gives strong support for vertical
FDI, as the relative wage premium has a positive eﬀect on exports home. This means
that aﬃliate exports to the home country are larger in host countries with high premiums
on skilled workers, i.e. countries with relatively cheap unskilled labor. The estimated
elasticity of exports to the home country with respect to the relative wage premia is
1.34, which is also signiﬁcant in economic terms. Home and host GDP are both highly
signiﬁcant. The high elasticity with respect to home GDP illustrates two points. First,
27We need not include industry-speciﬁc measures of scale economies and freight costs, since we apply
country rather than industry data, contrary to Brainard (1997), for example. This is done because our
variable of interest - the skill diﬀerence variable - is a country-speciﬁc variable and could not explain
additional variation in the dependent variable across industries.
28Host country dummies need not be included, because host country GDP accounts for the diﬀerences.
However, we do consider host country ﬁxed eﬀects for a robustness check in Table 6.
16an increase in the size of the home economy will tend to give rise to more home-based
MNEs, which leads to more aﬃliates abroad. Second, the increase in the size of the home
economy tends to make this a more important export market for aﬃliates, either in terms
of ﬁnal goods or intermediate inputs. Thus, we would expect a high sensitivity to home
GDP in aﬃliate exports from hosts to the home country. The elasticity of exports to the
home country with respect to host country GDP is close to one. Furthermore, countries
located far away and with high levels of investment costs and high levels of protection are
less likely to be used as bases for exports back to the home country.
The variable protection has the expected sign, but is not signiﬁcant. Investigating this
variable, we ﬁnd that it is highly correlated with the investment cost variable (correlation
coeﬃcient 0.75), which leads to a severe problem of multicollinearity and, thus, insigniﬁ-
cance of the regression coeﬃcient of the protection variable. On a fundamental level, this
simply means that host countries pursuing restrictive trade policies also put restrictions
on investment. On a more practical level, both variables are constructed out of question-
naires to decision makers in MNEs and there may therefore be a tendency to give similar
answers to similar questions. Carr et al. (2001) face the same multicollinearity problem.
Next, we compare our results on the wage premium with results on previously used
measures of skill diﬀerence. In column two, we report the results, when skill diﬀerence is
measured by relative skill endowments (skrijt) like in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and
Maskus (1999, 2001). The results demonstrate that diﬀerences in relative skill endowments
have a positive, but not signiﬁcant, eﬀect on exports back to the home country. In column
three, we replace relative labor endowments with GDP per capita (gdpcapjt), which is
claimed to be a substitute variable for skills by Brainard (1997) and Hanson et al. (2001).
In this speciﬁcation, the larger the GDP per capita of the home country relative to the host
country, the more vertical FDI is observed, although this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant either.
Naturally, GDP per capita diﬀerences across countries may not only reﬂect skill diﬀerences
but also endowment diﬀerences in other production factors or total factor productivity
diﬀerences.
All in all, the base model with the relative wage premium seems to work quite well,
whereas relative skill endowments or skill substitute variables do not give the expected
17results.29 While GDP per capita may just be too imperfect a measure of skill diﬀerences,
the disappointing results from using skill endowment diﬀerences are more disturbing. One
explanation might be that the ILO data on professional occupation is not a good proxy
for relative endowments of skilled workers.
A further indication of the problems related to the ILO measure on skilled labor is that
the correlation between relative ILO skill levels and other indicators of human capital is
low, as demonstrated in section 3.1. This implies that measures of skills in a panel dataset
with many countries and a long time horizon are very noisy and the ILO data are among
the noisiest. Hence, it is diﬃcult to establish robust results on the skill variable.
Moreover, section 3.1 has also shown that the links between factor endowments and
factor costs are weak, even though all skill and human capital variables have the expected
signs of the correlation. In the remaining part of the paper, we therefore focus on results
based on the wage premium.
After having established the relative skilled-wage premium to be a strongly signiﬁcant
variable explaining vertical FDI, we test for the robustness of this result. The results on
robustness are given in Table 6. For the convenience of the reader, we repeat our baseline
speciﬁcation, Table 5 column 1, again in Table 6 column 1. Then, we reestimate this
speciﬁcation using instrumental variables for the relative skilled wage premium, because
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) argued that the skilled wage premium may be endogenously
determined by US FDI in Mexico. The coeﬃcient for the skilled-wage premium increases
in size and remains strongly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of the control variables remain
qualitatively the same, except that the coeﬃcient of the trade protection variable switches
sign, although it remains insigniﬁc a n t ,a n dt h eh o m ec o u n t r yG D Pc o e ﬃcient becomes
insigniﬁcant.30
Next, we consider additional host-country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for omitted country
characteristics. Once more, the coeﬃcient on the skilled-wage premium remains signiﬁcant
-a l b e i to n l ya tt h e10% signiﬁcance level. However, the inclusion of host-country ﬁxed
29We have also run extensive regressions on all skill and human capital variables described in the data
appendix without ﬁnding any robust results.
30As instrument, we use the percentage of secondary school completed in the population.
18eﬀects changes the signs of the host country GDP- and investment cost coeﬃcients. The
ﬁxed eﬀects thus interact with those variables that have most of their variation in the cross-
sectional rather than in the time dimension. Since the theories on FDI are typical long-run
theories, the time dimension is less important and most explanatory power should stem
from cross-sectional variation, which loses importance in speciﬁcations with host country
ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, speciﬁcations with host-country ﬁxed eﬀects are not our preferred
ones.
Finally, we check the eﬀects of the wage-premium when speciﬁed in absolute value.31
Using the absolute value of the relative wage premium (in logs) includes the case when
foreign aﬃliates reap beneﬁts from relatively cheap engineers as much as from relatively
cheap production workers. The former case is relevant if some foreign aﬃliate activity
in some host countries is relatively high-skilled labor intensive, e.g. in research labs.
As can be seen in column 4, Table 6, the skill-premium remains signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level with the correct sign. Hence, our sample is not sensitive to the critique of
Carr et al. (2001) by Blonigen et al. (2002), who show that in the (mainly unskilled-labor
abundant) US inward sample and the (mainly skilled-labor abundant) US outward sample,
skill-diﬀerences have opposite eﬀects on aﬃliate activity.
We have also checked the robustness of the baseline estimation with respect to alter-
native measures of trade barriers, such as trade openness, import duties, export duties,
or the additional inclusion of GDP per capita, the hourly average wage costs and the av-
erage eﬀective corporate taxes of US aﬃliates. The coeﬃcient of the relative skilled-wage
premium remains signiﬁcant for them all.
5.1.2 Local sales
Next, we investigate how local sales depend on the wage premium. According to theory, the
impact of the wage premium should be smaller on local sales than on exports to the home
country, as local sales are more related to horizontal FDI. To simplify the comparison,
31Blonigen et al. (2002) argue this to be the correct speciﬁcation for testing the KC model when
investigating the eﬀect of diﬀerences in relative endowments. An analogue speciﬁcation is therefore also
provided for the gravity equation estimation.
19we repeat the baseline speciﬁcation with the dependent variable aﬃliate exports to home
countries (from Table 5) in Table 7 (column 1) and then present the new results on local
sales in column 2.
The qualitative results are in line with the previous regression, with the exception that
relative wage costs now only have a marginally signiﬁcant (and smaller) impact on the
dependent variable. This reﬂects the fact that local sales are driven much less by wage
cost considerations than are aﬃliate sales to the home country.
In quantitative terms, the results are somewhat diﬀerent as compared to the baseline.
First, the size of the host market has a strong impact on sales, which is diﬀerent from the
eﬀect on exports back to the home country. This is likely to reﬂect a demand-side eﬀect, as
local sales are driven by market access motives, which depend on local market size. Second,
the home country market size is of less importance. After all, local sales do not depend
on demand from the home country as do sales to the home country. Third, local sales
are less sensitive to distance and investment costs than exports to home countries. Once
again, this is in line with the expectations, as horizontal MNEs are willing to accept these
costs, if there is no alternative way of getting access to the local market without facing
high trade costs. Finally, protection has an insigniﬁcant positive rather than a negative
impact on local sales, which may reﬂect the tariﬀ jumping argument of horizontal FDI as
found by Brainard (1997).
5.1.3 Exports to third countries
Column 3 gives the results where we have used aﬃliate exports to third countries (export
platform FDI) as the dependent variable. In qualitative terms, the results are similar to
what happened to exports to the home country. In quantitative terms, some diﬀerences
arise. First, relative wage costs have a weaker, but still negative and strongly signiﬁcant,
impact on exports to third markets as compared to the home market. Consequently,
relative wage premia are still important for exports to other countries, but the impact is
marginally smaller than for exports to the home country. This may be due to the fact
that exports to third countries depend more strongly on the relative wages of the host and
20export-market country, rather than those of the host and home country.32
S e c o n d ,t h eh o m em a r k e te ﬀect is signiﬁcantly smaller than for exports to the home
country, as the home market no longer aﬀects demand as in the case of exports to the
home country. Consequently, the only impact from home GDP is through the “supply
side” scale eﬀect, where larger countries are the homes of a larger number of MNEs.
Third, host country GDP seems to be much more important for exports to third markets
than to the home market. The combination of ﬁxed costs at the plant level and trade
costs means that aﬃliates are more likely to be located in large markets (see Braconier
and Ekholm, 2001b). Yet, local sales are more dependent on host-country size than exports
to third countries, since they are directly driven by host country demand while exports
are not. Fourth, the distance to the home country plays a much smaller role in exports to
third countries in comparison to exports to the home country, as the cost associated with
transporting goods back to the home market is no longer important.33 Finally, protection
seems to have a very strong and negative impact on exports to third countries, suggesting
that ﬁrms engage in platform FDI to countries with liberal trade regimes. This result
follows directly from the fact that export platform FDI requires considerable trade ﬂows
to many countries and is thus most sensitive to trade barriers. All in all, platform FDI
seems to be driven by similar factors as “pure” vertical FDI and relative wage premia also
play an important role in explaining aﬃliate exports to other countries.
32We do not know the destination of exports to other countries. If assuming that those export markets
are primarily neighboring countries, then average neighborhood variables for relative wage premia, relative
GDP, and neighborhood country import protection can be generated. We have run extensive regressions
with these additional variables and ﬁnd that the relative skill premium of the home and host country
indeed becomes smaller (albeit it remains signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level) and the skill premium of
neighboring countries and the host country becomes highly signiﬁcant with the expected sign. Other
neighboring country variables of protection and GDP are not signiﬁcant.
33Still, distance has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on exports to third countries, which indicates that transport
costs for intermediates from the home country to aﬃliates or the costs of supervising remotely located
aﬃliates are signiﬁcant. Note also that cultural diﬀerences and language diﬀerences may increase with
distance and render the export of management practices more diﬃcult.
215.1.4 Total sales
In column 4, total sales are used as the dependent variable. This is the FDI measure
most commonly used in the previous literature. We ﬁnd that all coeﬃcients have the
same sign as in the baseline regression with exports to the home country. In particular,
the coeﬃcient on the relative skilled-wage premium is signiﬁcant. In contrast to previous
speciﬁcations, the trade protection variable becomes signiﬁcant with the expected sign.
Not surprisingly, the quantitative size of all the coeﬃcients is in between the coeﬃcients
of regressions of local sales and exports to the home country, as total sales are composed
of the separate components local sales, and exports to home and third countries.
5.1.5 Imports from parents
Finally, column 5 gives the results for a regression where aﬃliate imports from parent
companies are used as the dependent variable. Qualitatively, all estimates are similar to
the ones in the previous speciﬁcations. Once more, some quantitative diﬀerences are worth
noting. The skilled-wage premium is of less importance for aﬃliate imports from parent
companies than for aﬃliate exports to home and third countries, but more important
than for local sales. While we argued that exports to the home country constitute the
closest measure of vertical FDI and thus, these are most sensitive to relative factor costs,
aﬃliate imports from parents may be less sensitive to factor costs, because some of these
imports are not further processed and are thus ﬁnal-good exports of the parent company
for which local factor costs are irrelevant. Moreover, some aﬃliate imports from parents
may contain speciﬁc technologies which would be disseminated as a public good if produced
abroad (see Matouschek, 1999). Hence, they would be produced at the parent plant, even
if its production costs were lower abroad. In contrast, the host country market size is more
important for aﬃliate imports from parents than for aﬃliate exports to parent countries,
because those imports may be sold after further processing in the host country market
(vertical FDI of the horizontal type in the terminology of Venables, 1999). Likewise,
protection, investment cost, and distance are of less importance for aﬃliate imports from
parent companies than for aﬃliate exports to parent countries, since those costs are borne
22to obtain access to the protected host country market.
5.2 The Knowledge Capital Model estimations
So far, we have established our results on the gravity equation approach. Here, we show
that our results also hold in the KC model approach. We use the Knowledge Capital
Model as speciﬁed by Carr et al. (2001) but replace their skill endowment variable with
the skilled-wage premium, i.e.:
RSALESIijt = β0 + β1GDPsumijt + β2 (GDPdifijt)
2 + β3WAGEP ijt (3)
+ β4INTERijt + β5DISTij + β6INVCjt + β7PROT jt + εijt,
where WAGEP ijt is now deﬁned as the diﬀerence between skilled-to-unskilled wage in the
home country and the same ratio in the host country, GDPsumijt is the sum of home
and host country real GDP, GDPdifijt is the diﬀerence between home and host country
GDP, and INTERijt is a multiplicative interaction term of GDPdifijt and WAGEP ijt.
The main diﬀerence of this speciﬁcation to the gravity equation approach (2) is its non-
linearity in relative country size and the wage premium, and the lack of log-linearization.
Note that the KC model and gravity approaches are non-nested hypotheses and cannot be
directly compared. As in the gravity equation, we also add a home country neighbourhood
dummy, and home country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The results are provided in Table 8. For each speciﬁcation, we also show the expected
signs based on Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Carr et al. (2001). Examining exports
back to the home country, we ﬁnd that the skilled-wage premium is not only signiﬁcant
at the ﬁve-per cent level with the correct sign, but its non-linear interaction term is also
signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level with the correct sign. These results diﬀer markedly
from Markusen and Maskus (2001)w h oﬁnd a negative relation between relative skill
endowments and aﬃliate exports back to the US. In general, however, the ﬁt is not as
good as for the gravity estimation, which is not surprising since direct levels rather than
logarithms of all variables are used. For example, neither the total market size of the host
and home country, nor the squared size diﬀerence of home and host markets are signiﬁcant.
23The number of signiﬁcant control variables is also smaller.34 35
In column 2, we do a robustness check and estimate the KC model with total sales as the
dependent variable (see Markusen and Maskus, 2001, and Carr et al., 2001). Once more,
we ﬁnd that the skilled-wage premium and its non-linear interaction term are signiﬁcant
with the correct signs. Moreover, all control variables except protection are now signiﬁcant
with the correct sign.
Finally, in column 3, we apply absolute values on the diﬀerence variables. As argued in
Blonigen et al. (2002), the contradicting results in Carr et al. (2001)a n dM a r k u s e na n d
Maskus (1999, 2001) may be due to a misspeciﬁcation when pooling the US-inward and
outward data and they show that applying absolute values of skill-diﬀerences and GDP-
diﬀerences causes a sign reversal of the skill variable in Carr et al.(2001). Interestingly,
our data do not have this property and results are even somewhat sharper in the absolute
value speciﬁcation. The explanation is that we do not pool US inward and outward FDI
data, instead we use US and Swedish outward FDI data. Hence, our home countries
are skill-labor abundant and have cheaper high-skilled labor relative to almost all host
countries so that the absolute value is mostly not binding. This can be seen by comparing
Figures 2 and 3.
All in all, we ﬁnd empirical support for the vertical FDI model, based on skill-premia,
while Markusen and Maskus (1999) reject it by using skill endowments. Thus the con-
clusion that vertical FDI is highly sensitive to relatively cheap low-skilled labor is robust
across the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, the use of diﬀerent FDI measures, diﬀerent esti-
mation techniques, and diﬀerent control variables.
34As in the gravity approach, investment cost and protection are insigniﬁcant. In addition, the protec-
tion variable also has the wrong sign. Only distance remains signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-per cent level.
35It is, however, interesting to note that the insigniﬁcance of the square-term and the GDP sum-term
constitute support in a vertical FDI model without ﬁrm-level scale economies (see, Markusen and Maskus
1999), where the only motive for FDI is factor price diﬀerences. In contrast to horizontal FDI including
scale economies at the ﬁrm—level, there should indeed be no inverse U-shape relation between vertical FDI
and size diﬀerence.
246 Concluding Remarks
In contrast to previous studies, we ﬁnd ample support for vertical FDI in the sense that
MNEs’ aﬃliate activities are aﬀected by relative wage costs. We ﬁnd that aﬃliate sales
increase when there is an increase in the relative skill premia between the host and the
home country. Therefore, relative factor costs are important for explaining patterns of
FDI, as suggested by the theoretical litterature, such as Helpman (1984) and Markusen
et al. (1996). Our results are robust to a number of changes in the speciﬁcation of the
empirical model and, consequently, we are conﬁdent that we have found robust support
for vertical FDI.
Not only do we ﬁnd evidence that relative skill premia aﬀect overall aﬃliate activities,
but we also investigate to what extent diﬀerent types of aﬃliate activities are driven
by diﬀerent determinants. The analysis shows that qualitatively, the results are similar
irrespective of whether we analyze local sales, exports to the home country, exports to
third countries or aﬃliate imports from the parent in the home country. Consequently,
relative wage premia even seem to aﬀect activities traditionally associated with horizontal
FDI (i.e. local sales). This means that the potential eﬀects of factor diﬀerences on FDI are
larger than previously thought. To illustrate the eﬀects of relative skill-premia on FDI, we
use the (well-known) widening skill-premia in the US between 1986 and 1994 and assess
how they have aﬀected FDI. The rise in the wage premium in the US exceeded that of
the average host country in our sample by 8%.36 Taking this change in the relative wage
premium as exogenous, we attribute to it a permanent decline in annual US aﬃliate sales
abroad of about 30 billion USD (in 1990 USD prices) or about half a percentage point
of US GDP. Hence, the scope of vertical FDI, i.e. FDI driven by relative factor costs, is
large.
Although the qualitative eﬀects are similar across types of activities, the quantitative
eﬀects diﬀer substantially. In most cases, we ﬁnd that these quantitative diﬀerences are in
36An OECD (1996) study documents a rise in the income spread between the ten percentile top and
the ten percentile bottom of 11% in the US during this period (p. 61f). In comparison, our speciﬁc wage
premium variable rose by 10% .
25line with what should be expected from the theoretical literature. We do, for example, ﬁnd
that exports to the home country are strongly dependent on relative skill premia and the
size of the home market, whereas local aﬃliate sales are more sensitive to the market size
of the host country. Still, it is the qualitative similarity that is the most striking result.
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297 Appendix
7.1 Data Description:
T h eb a s e l i n es p e c i ﬁcation in table 5 uses data on the following countries with an observa-
tion for at least one year. Swedish aﬃliates have positive exports to Sweden from Argentina
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Feder-
ation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela. There are missing independent variables for Cyprus, Ecuador, Esto-
nia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka. The data on the dependent
variables can be considered as complete for Sweden.
US aﬃliates export to the US from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belgium,
Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Venezuela. Missing
on top of Markusen and Maskus (2001) are Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, New
Zealand, and Panama due to lack of information on some independent variables. The num-
ber of countries included in this study as well as in the two previous studies by Brainard
(1993) and Markusen and Maskus (2001) include a rather small number of partner coun-
tries to the US. One may suspect that some countries with US aﬁliates are excluded from
the database of Markusen and Maskus (2001), our data source, if independent variables
a r em i s s i n g .H e n c e ,w ec a n n o tb es u r et oh a v et h ec o m p l e t eu n i v e r s eo fU Sa ﬃliates. In
general, observations for the years 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 are used. Next, we give a
deﬁnition and a description of the data used in our study as well as their sources.
30VFDI
j i
i
S S
S
+
j i
i
U U
U
+
1
0.5
0.5 1
HFDI
0j
0i
Home country
origin (country i)
Host country
origin (countryj)
VFDI
j i
i
S S
S
+
j i
i
U U
U
+
1
0.5
0.5 1
HFDI
0j
0i
Home country
origin (country i)
VFDI
j i
i
S S
S
+
j i
i
U U
U
+
1
0.5
0.5 1
HFDI
0j
0i
Home country
origin (country i)
Host country
origin (countryj)
Figure 1: Regions of FDI in the KC model. Note: Si(Sj) is the home(host) country’s
endowment of skilled labor. Ui(Uj) is the home(host) country’s endowment of unskilled
labor.
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Figure 2: Outward and inward FDI in Carr et al. (2001).
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Figure 3: Outward FDI for Sweden and the US.
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Figure 4: Illustrating diﬀerent ﬂows of FDI.
34Table 1: Previous empirical results.
Main skill Sample Main FDI Evidence for:
measure: coverage: measures:
HFDI VFDI
Brainard (1993) Diﬀerences in US inward and Exports to the Mixed
endowments of outward FDI, cross home country
skilled and un- section of industries, Local sales of
skilled labor, diﬀ-( B E A ) a ﬃliates
erences in GDP
per capita
Brainard (1997) Diﬀerence in ibid Total sales of Yes No
GDP per worker aﬃliates
Carr, Markusen Diﬀerences in US inward and Total sales of Support for KC
and Maskus relativ endow- outward FDI, aﬃliates model
(2001) ments of skilled (BEA)
labor (ILO)
Markusen and ibid ibid Exports to the Yes Mixed
Maskus (1999) home country (No support for
Total exports by the VFDI and
aﬃliates KC models
Aﬃliate local sales in outward FDI)
Markusen and ibid ibid Total sales of Yes No
Maskus (2001)a ﬃliates (Rejection of
KC model)
Blonigen, Davies Absolute value of US inward and Total sales of Yes No
and Head diﬀerences in outward FDI, (BEA) aﬃliates, (No support for
(2002) skill labor FDI stocks (OECD) Bilateral FDI stocks KC model)
abundancy (ILO)
Hanson, Mataloni GDP per capita US outward FDI, Total exports and Mixed
and Slaughter of host country panel of industries, local sales by aﬃliates
(2001)( B E A ) I m p o r t s t o a ﬃliates
for further processing
from parents
Braconier, Relative wage US and Swedish Exports to the Yes
Norbäck and premium outward FDI, home country and (Support for
Urban for host country (BEA and IUI) third countries KC model
skilled labor Local sales and total using wage data)
(UBS) sales of aﬃliates
Imports from parents
35Table 2: Labor endowments and labor cost correlation matrix.
SKR TYRDF TYR SYR HYR ENROLLS WAGEP
SKR 1
TYRDF 0.60 1
TYR 0.59 0.90 1
SYR 0.50 0.86 0.86 1
HYR 0.48 0.71 0.78 0.57 1
ENROLLS 0.56 0.75 0.69 0.66 0.44 1
WAGEP 0.32 0.42 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.411
Table 3: Destination of aﬃl a t es a l e sa ss h a r e so ft o t a la ﬃliate sales.
Local sales Exports to the Exports to Imports from
home market other countries parents
Year: US: Swe: US: Swe: US: Swe: US: Swe:
1986 63 74 13 5 25 22 11 13
1990 61 68 12 4 27 27 8 10
1994 59 69 15 9 26 23 10 13
1998 56 69 16 7 28 24 8 12
Note: All numbers are in percentages of total aﬃliate sales.
36Table 4: Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev Min/Max No obs.
US: Swe: US: Swe: US: Swe: US: Swe:
Dep variables:
Total sales 17740 960 27927 2103 16/1203160 . 0 2 / 13306 135 197
Exports to 2505 94 7641 339 0.9/52297 0.001/2595 136 121
home country
Exports to 4748 305 8342 606 0.8/43329 3x10−9/4854 137 151
third countries
Local sales 9022 682 15825 1636 12/65448 0.3/11345 159 194
Imports from 1307 116 4378 204 0.8/35087 0.01/1062 202 167
home parent
Indep variables:
GDPi: 6824 227 898 145 6 8 1/8023 206/245 183 374
GDPj 373 357 756 1018 0.242/5319 0.095/8023 192 275
GDPCAP 11.18 16.31 20.95 28.07 0.55/116.05 0.57/251.49 179 270
SKR 2.07 3.72 1.42 5.73 0.58/10.42 0.90/53.63 1511 65
WAGEP 1.465 1.459 0.75 0.90 0.64/7.23 0.54/9.92 150 149
INVC 37.13 37.84 11.57 12.02 12.50/79.43 12.50/79.43 158 162
PROT 32.13 32.58 15.911 5.58 6.80/85.08 6.90/85.08 158 162
DIST 7937 4171 4081.8 4170.8 734/163701 9.31/17480 2122 9 7
Note: All dependent variables are measured in million USD. GDPi and GDPj are measued
in billion USD.
37Table 5: Exploring "pure" vertical FDI.
Dep. variable: Aﬃliate exports to the home country
Skill measure: Relative Relative Relative
wage premium skill endowment GDP per cap
(wagep)( skr)( gdpcap)
gdpi 7.08** 7.01*6 . 3 7 *
(2.04) (1.90) (1.89)
gdpj 0.76*** 0.61*** 0.76***
(7.65) (5.99) (7.37)
dist -1.12*** -1.14*** -0.99***
(-6.95) (-7.09) (-5.98)
prot -0.42 -0.62 -0.83**
(-0.99) (-1.42) (-2.06)
invc -1.66** -0.86 -1.05
(-2.54) (-1.21)( - 1.51)
skill 1.34*** 0.04 0.08
(3.30) (0.13) (0.50)
ADJ 0.4 0.140 . 4 8
(1.12) (0.35) (1.23)
US -18.89 -18.95 -16.76
(-1.61)( - 1.51)( - 1.46)
R2 (%) 69.0 63.9 65.9
F5 2 . 1*** 43.5*** 50.3***
Obs 219 204 232
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent
level, respectively. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported
time dummies are always included. All variables are in logs except US and ADJ.
38Table 6: Robustness of the skilled wage premium.
Dep. variable: Aﬃliate exports to the home country
Speciﬁcation: (OLS) (IV) (FE) (ABS)
gdpi 7.08** 3.64 7.78*** 7.79**
(2.04) (0.85) (2.66) (2.20)
gdpj 0.76*** 0.82*** -0.190 . 7 4 ***
(7.65) (6.31)( - 0 .18) (7.25)
dist -1.12*** -1.30*** -1.66*** -1.07***
(-6.92) (-6.03) (-9.19) (-6.56)
prot -0.42 0.27 -0.08 -0.59
(-0.99) (0.43) (-0.20) (-1.39)
invc -1.66** -3.23*** 0.45 -1.50**
(-2.54) (-2.75) (0.44) (-2.23)
wagep 1.34*** 5.21*** 0.70* 1.07**
(3.30) (2.40) (1.80) (2.04)
ADJ 0.40 0.68 1.76*** 0.35
(1.12) (1.54) (2.85) (0.93)
US -18.89 -7.05 -20.92** -21.36*
(-1.61)( - 0 .49) (-2.12) (-1.78)
R2 (%) 69.0 53.9 85.6 68.0
F5 2 . 1*** 30.4*** 48.7*** 52.5***
Obs 2192 152 192 19
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent level,
respectively. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time
dummies and home country dummies are always included in the OLS and IV speciﬁcations.
The IV-speciﬁcation uses the percentage of secondary schooling completed in total population
as instrument. In the FE-speciﬁcation, we also control for host-country ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally,
the ABS-speciﬁcation uses the absolute value of the the wage premium variable, wagep.A l l
variables are in logs except US and ADJ.
39Table 7: Examining diﬀerent FDI measures.
Type: Vertical FDI: Horizontal FDI: Platform FDI: FDI: Vertical Integr:
Dep. Exports to Local sales Exports to Total sales Imports from
variable home country third countries parent
gdpi 7.08** 6.92*** 4.77* 5.65*** 6.02*
(2.04) (3.57) (1.72) (2.80) (1.91)
gdpj 0.76*** 1.18*** 0.92*** 0.98*** 1.05***
(7.65) (18.33) (11.81)( 17.01)( 12.89)
dist -1.12*** -0.56*** -0.84*** -0.65*** -0.58***
(-6.92) (-5.50) (-6.13) (-6.38) (-3.77)
prot -0.42 0.06 -0.78** -0.39 -0.11
(-0.99) (0.28) (-2.36) (-1.64) (-0.26)
invc -1.66** -0.85** -2.29*** -1.21*** -0.88
(-2.54) (-2.35) (-4.52) (-3.12) (-1.47)
wagep 1.34*** 0.54* 1.10*** 0.61* 0.82**
(3.30) (1.70) (3.40) (1.65)( 2 .47)
ADJ 0.40 0.34 -0.66* 0.150 . 4 0
(1.12) (1.42) (-1.66) (0.61)( 0 .82)
US -18.89 -20.00*** -12.25 -15.39** -17.50
(-1.61)( - 3 .04) (-1.30) (-2.25) (-1.63)
R2 (%) 69.0 80.2 72.9 80.7 54.6
F5 2 . 1*** 91.1*** 54.7*** 110.4*** 38.7***
Obs 219 254 232 241 254
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent level,
respectively. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time dummies
are always included. All variables are in logs except US and ADJ.
40Table 8: The Knowledge Capital Model (KC model).
Dep. var: Exports to the home country Total sales of aﬃliates
Spec: (Exp. sign) (OLS) (Exp. sign) (OLS) (ABS)
GDPsum (+) 0.20 (+) 5.21*** 5.31***
(1.17) (3.08) (3.07)
(GDPdif)
2 (-) 1.68x10−5 (-) -5.96x10−4*** -5.35x10−4***
(0.55) (-2.63) (2.38)
DIST -0.24* -0.97*** -1.02***
(-1.96) (-3.61)( - 3 .66)
PROT 53.16 49.80 42.99
(1.43) (0.51)( 0 .44)
INVC -60.47 -360.41*** -358.02***
(-1.35) (-2.51)( - 2 .65)
WAGEP (+) 5381.50** (+) 13626.33** 16335.23**
(2.01)( 2 .24) (2.29)
INTER (-) -2.11* (-) -4.34* -5.84**
(-1.84) (-1.71)( - 2 .23)
ADJ 6430.78*** 8389.65 7851.10
(2.64) (1.42) (1.30)
US 4089.64** 17059.16*** 16904.94***
(2.24) (3.07) (3.13)
R2 (%) 27.8 44.4 44.1
F 2.43** 9.31*** 8.46***
Obs 2192 4 1 241
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent level, respec-
tively. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time dummies are always
included. The expected signs are taken from Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Carr et al. (2001),
respectively. In the OLS-speciﬁcation, WAGEP is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between skilled-to-unskilled
wage in the home country and the same ratio in the host country. In the ABS-speciﬁcation, the absolute
value is applied to this variable. The same applies to the diﬀerence in GDP, GDPdif, which is used in
the interaction variable, INTER.A ﬃliate sales are measured in million USD and GDP in billion USD.
41Table 9: Dependent variables
Description: Source:
Exports to Aggregate exports of all aﬃliates in a host Swedish aﬃliate data: IUI Database;
home country: country to the home country (to the parent US aﬃliate data: Bureau of
company for Swedish MNEs) during a year Economic Analysis, U.S. Department
expressed in 1990 USD, using current exchange of Commerce; Data are obtained
rates and the US GDP deﬂator. Data on exchange from Markusen and Maskus (1999)
rates and the GDP deﬂator have been taken except for 1998 which are found in
from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 68, (2000). table III.F4 on:
We employ data for 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998; http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ai/pi/
idn0255.exe
Exports to Aggregate exports of all aﬃliates in a host table III.F8;ibid;
third countries: country to third countries; other characteristics
as above;
Local sales: Aggregate sales of aﬃliates in host country; table III.F7;ibid;
other characteristics as above;
Imports Aggregate imports from parents in the home Swedish aﬃliate data: IUI database;
from parents: country of all aﬃliates in a host country; US aﬃliate data: Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department
of Commerce, table III.I 9;
42Table 10: Wages by Skill
Description: Source:
Skilled wage Pre-tax annual income in SFR of an, on average, 35- Union Bank of Switzerland
year old electrical engineer with a university, technical (formerly SBV), Prices
university or higher technical college degree and at and Earnings, various
least ﬁve years of practical experience in the machinery years;
or electrical equipment industry in a major city
(usually the capital or ﬁnancial center) of a country;
The journal issue 1979/80 is matched with the
observations of the year 1978, the issue 1985 with the
year 1986, the issue 1991 with the year 1990, the issue
1994 with the year 1994 and the issue 1997 with the
year 1998;
Unskilled wage: Pre-tax annual income in SFR of industrial workers UBS (formerly SBV),
(toolmaker) of an, on average, 35-year old worker with Prices and Earnings,
3 years of vocational training and at least ten years of various years;
practical experience in a large company of the
metalworking industry; Data availability as above;
WAGEP: Log of ratio of home-country skilled wage to unskilled
wage divided by host-country skilled wage relative
to unskilled wage;
43Table 11: Human Capital and Skill Endowment Variables
Description: Source:
SKR: Ratio of high-skilled labor to total labor force; International Labour Organization
Skilled labor is the professional categories 0/1 (ILO); Data for US aﬃliates
and 2 according to the ISCO68 classiﬁcation of ILO; obtained from Markusen and
For 1998, most countries report according to the Maskus (2001);
ISCO88 classiﬁcation which diﬀers substantially;
To avoid a structural break in the variable
construction, the growth rate of professional
categories 1, 2 and 3 of ISCO88 from 1994 until
1998 is calculated and multiplied by the levels of
ISCO68 values of the year 1994 to obtain estimated
values for the year 1998 whenever possible.
Sweden does not report category 2, ISCO68, separately
from category 3 in the year 1994; Hence, category 3 is
included in 1994; Another structural break occurs in
1998 when Statistic Sweden switches its reporting to
ISCO88; Time ﬁxed eﬀects take fully account of this
break; However, the time trend is not recoverable for
Sweden;
TYRDF: Average years of schooling by country; Correction of Domenech and de la
Barro and Lee (1996) data for a number of countries; Fuente (2001)
Data available quintannielly from 1970 until 1998;
Matching of closest years;
TYR: Average years of schooling; Data availability as above; Barro and Lee (1996)
SYR: Average years of secondary schooling in population; ibid
HYR: Average years of university education; ibid
ENROLLS: School enrollment, secondary schooling; % gross; ibid
ENROLLT: School enrollment, tertiary; % gross; ibid
LSC: Percentage of secondary schooling completed in total ibid
population; ibid
44Table 12: Trade, Investment Barriers and other control variables:
Description: Source:
INVC: Unweighted average of answers on an ordinal scale World Economic Forum
between 1 (low cost) and 100 (high cost) to questions
on obstacles to foreign direct investment answered
by business representatives in the corresponding ;
host country 1986, 1990, 1994 from
Markusen and Maskus (2001 )and 1998 constructed
from the Global Competitiveness Report;
PROT: Ordinal measure of protection on the scale 1 (free trade) ibid
to 100 (strongest protection) of host country from
business survey; ibid;
DIST: Distance of host country capital from home country IUI database and Markusen
capital; and Maskus (2001);
GDPi: Home country GDP in constant 1995 USD; World Development
Indicators
GDPj: Host country GDP in constant 1995 USD; ibid
GDPCAP: GDP per capita of home relative to host country; ibid
45Table 13: Labor endowments and labor cost correlation matrix.
UBS data Oﬃcial Data
Engineers Production Ratio Engineers Production Ratio
workers workers
Germany 69000 SFR 41000 SFR 1.66 7196 DM* 4761 DM* 1.51
Hungary 7400 SFR 4800 SFR 1.54 127225 HUF 58689 HUF 2.17
Japan 78800 SFR 72500 SFR 1.08 348000 Yen 326000 Yen 1.07
Sweden 54300 SFR 40600 SFR 1.34 26300 SEK* 16900 SEK* 1.56
UK 49900 SFR 41400 SFR 1.21 615.1 £** 388.6 £** 1.58
US 75500 SFR 56100 SFR 1.35 69400 $ 60200 $ 1.15
Note: Sources: UBS; Statistical Yearbook of Germany 1999, Statistical Yearbook of Japan 1998;
Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 1998; Statistical Yearbook of Salaries, Statistics Sweden, 1997;
New Earnings Survey 1997, Part D: analysis by occupation, UK Oﬃce for National Statistics.
German data are for 1995 (UBS for 1997); Remarks: *monthly earnings; ** weekly earnings; Hun-
garian and Japanese data are for 1998 (UBS 1997); average gross monthly earnings; Germany:
Electrical engineer and toolmaker 30-34 years of age; Hungary: Mechanical engineer and mechan-
ical instrument mechanics; Japan: System engineer and Machine inspecting worker in ﬁrms with
100 to 999 employees (contractual earnings); Sweden: civil engineers monthly gross wage and
electrical installation worker monthly gross wages in 1997. U.K.: electrical engineers and toolmak-
ers, toolﬁtters or markers-out; avg. gross earnings at fulltime presence; US: median US salaries
of civil engineers with an M.A. (5 years of university education) and a B.A. (3 years of college
education) from a non-random survey of 550 questionaires of a newsletter for civil engineers in
1998 (http://www.cenews.com/edsalsur0599.html); The correlation of the ratios of UBS data and
oﬃcial data is 0.57 .
46